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Abstract 
 
"Damned by Faint Praise" is the phenomenon whereby weak positive information 
leads to a negative change in belief. This seemingly conflicts with normative Bayesian 
predictions, which prescribe that positive information should only exert a positive 
change in belief. We argue that the negative belief change is due to an inference from 
critical missing evidence, that is, an implicit argument from ignorance. Such an 
inference is readily incorporated within a version of Bayes' Theorem incorporating the 
concept of epistemic closure. This reformalization provides a general theoretical 
framework for the phenomenon that clearly outlines those conditions under which it 
should be observed, and its conceptual relationship with other argumentation 
phenomena. 
 
Keywords: Belief revision; Bayesian Probability; Argumentation; Persuasion; 
Testimony; Pragmatics 
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James is punctual and polite (and useless): A Bayesian formalization of faint praise 
 
 ‘James is a polite and punctual pupil’ 
The above sentence clearly identifies positive aspects of James’ character. 
Were this, however, the only information you were given about James within the 
context of a reference letter, it seems likely that your impression of him might be 
lowered. In colloquial English, one might say that James was ‘damned by faint praise’.  
The ‘Boomerang effect’, by which a very weak positive argument can actually 
lead to a negative change in belief, is already well documented within social 
psychology (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1996). This effect is assumed to occur through 
the recipient’s internal generation of stronger counter-arguments. We, however, are 
specifically concerned with the effect of weak arguments that clearly exclude 
important information relating to the issue in question. Following the familiar 
colloquial expression ‘damned by faint praise’, we shall refer to negative belief change 
following the receipt of positive evidence in these cases as the Faint Praise effect. In 
the Boomerang effect, the argument recipient has access to specific knowledge of 
counter-arguments. In the Faint Praise effect, there is no specific knowledge of 
counter-arguments, though there may be a suspicion that the argument proponent is 
not providing all the evidence at their disposal. Kervyn, Bergsieker and Fiske (2012; 
see also, Madera, Hebl, & Martin, 2009) demonstrated the ‘innuendo effect’, whereby 
a target individual described as warm (“very nice, sociable, and outgoing person” [p. 
79]) was rated as less competent than a target described generally (“a very positive 
overall impression” [p. 79]), with the converse also being true when the target was 
described as competent. One way in which positive information about a particular 
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character trait can have a negative influence is if that trait is perceived as being 
negatively correlated with other desirable traits (as with warmth and competence). In 
the current paper, we demonstrate how a Faint Praise effect can arise rationally 
without the need for such a perception.   
The Faint Praise and Boomerang effects differ when measured against Bayes’ 
theorem as the normative standard for belief revision. The negative change in belief in 
the case of the Boomerang effect is unremarkable in that the proponent-supplied, weak 
positive argument is outweighed by recipient-supplied stronger negative 
considerations. This is unproblematic because degrees of belief should be updated 
with respect to all the arguments/evidence considered, whether provided by the 
argument proponent, or generated by the argument recipient themselves. By contrast, 
there is no explicit negative evidence in the case of the Faint Praise effect, so that the 
observed belief change appears to conflict with the prescription of Bayesian belief 
revision that positive evidence should lead to positive change - or, at best, have no real 
effect (Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983; Lopes, 1985). Here, however, we present and test a 
Bayesian formalization from which the Faint Praise effect follows as a normatively 
correct inference.   
  
Formalizing the Faint Praise Effect 
 To facilitate the description of our formalization, we use an example that will 
recur throughout this paper. The example is of a reference letter written in order to 
support James’ application to read mathematics at university. 
According to Bayes’ theorem, people should update their beliefs in a 
hypothesis on receipt of new information as follows: 
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P(h) is an individual’s prior degree of belief in the truth of the hypothesis under 
scrutiny (e.g., James is good at maths) and P(e|h) is the likelihood term, which 
captures the sensitivity of the test (its ‘hit rate’ in signal detection terms). This 
conditional probability is the individual’s subjective belief in the probability that the 
evidence provided would be found given that the hypothesis were true: In the current 
example, this might refer to the likelihood of the referee writing ‘James is good at 
maths’ if James is good at maths. P(¬h) (the probability of “not h”) corresponds to an 
individual’s prior degree of belief in the falsity of the hypothesis (e.g., James is not 
good at maths) and thus equals 1 – P(h). P(e|¬h) is the ‘false positive rate’ of the 
evidence. This is the individual’s belief in the probability of the positive evidence 
being provided given that the hypothesis is, in fact, false (e.g., the likelihood of the 
referee writing ‘James is good at maths’, if he were not). The denominator of the 
equation represents the base rate of the evidence item (regardless of the truth or falsity 
of the hypothesis). P(h|e) is the individual’s posterior degree of belief in the 
hypothesis given this new piece of evidence. Assuming P(e|h) ≥ P(e|¬h) (that is, 
assuming the evidence is not thought to be misleading), evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis, no matter how weak, can never decrease the person’s degree of belief in 
the hypothesis. Bayes’ theorem thus stipulates that positive evidence should only have 
a positive impact on belief change. Yet the Faint Praise effect is seemingly a 
demonstration of the opposite: weak positive evidence resulting in a negative change 
in belief.   
 Consideration of a well-known type of informal argument, the so-called 
“argument from ignorance”, however, shows how the Faint Praise effect is actually 
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amenable to a Bayesian formalization. Arguments from ignorance are arguments 
based on the absence of evidence, such as: 
 
‘Ghosts exist because nobody has proved that they don’t.’ 
 
Examples like this originally led to the view that arguments from ignorance were 
fallacious (e.g., Copi & Cohen, 1990; Evans & Palmer, 1983; Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004). Oaksford & Hahn (2004), however, noted that not all arguments 
from ignorance seem equally weak (see also Walton, 1992). There are examples of 
this argument form that seem far more plausible. For example: 
 
‘The train will not stop in Oxford, because an Oxford stop is not listed in the 
timetable.’  
  
One factor that influences the strength of arguments from ignorance is 
epistemic closure (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Walton, 1992). The concept of epistemic 
closure is best illustrated through an example: Upon consulting a railway timetable to 
determine whether the 12:45 Cardiff to London train stops at Oxford, one assumes that 
the timetable provides a complete list of all the stations, and only those stations, at 
which the train will stop – in other words, the timetable is a database that is 
epistemically closed. Consequently, if Oxford is not included on the timetable then 
one can confidently conclude that the train will not stop at Oxford and hence the 
argument above seems entirely reasonable.  
How, then, does epistemic closure explain the ‘damned by faint praise’ 
phenomenon?  We propose that the negative change in belief brought about by a weak 
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positive argument results from an implicit argument from ignorance. If James’ maths 
teacher writes a reference to support James’ application for a university mathematics 
course that reads ‘James is a polite and punctual pupil’, then he is flouting the 
conversational maxim of quantity: “Make your contribution as informative as is 
required” (Grice, 1975/2001, p. 171). Through a recognition that James’ maths teacher 
would surely know more about James than these two facts (specifically, his maths 
ability) and presumably be motivated to include this information were it positive, the 
reader can imply that the referee must “be wishing to impart information that he is 
reluctant to write down” (Grice, 1975/2001, p. 171). Thus, the possible impact of such 
evidence is best understood as an example of an argument from ignorance – that is, the 
effect of not saying “James is good at maths”.  
 Hahn and Oaksford (2007) presented a general, Bayesian formalization of the 
argument from ignorance that included the concept of epistemic closure. In addition to 
e and ¬e, a third possibility, represented by the term n, is included in this 
formalization. Here, n (‘nothing’) refers to a lack of evidence (i.e., not explicitly 
reporting either “e” or “not e”), whilst ¬e refers to explicit negative evidence (saying 
“not e”, for example, “James is not good at maths”). Such an approach is familiar from 
Artificial Intelligence where one might distinguish three possibilities in a database 
search regarding a proposition (h): the search can either respond in the affirmative (e), 
the negative (¬e), or it can find nothing on the subject (n). Epistemic closure has been 
invoked here to license inferences from search failure (i.e., a query resulting in 
nothing) to non-existence, given that the database is assumed to be complete.  
The Bayesian formalization of epistemic closure is analogous; however, it 
acknowledges that closure can be a matter of degree, ranging from complete closure, 
through moderate closure, to no closure at all. Consequently, it is best conceptualized 
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in probabilistic terms (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). For example, one might be certain 
that one has lost a sock after looking throughout the house, but also be fairly certain if 
one has only looked in several key locations, such as the drawer and the washing 
machine. 
The three-valued approach to evidence, which allows one to capture degree of 
closure by varying the probability of a 'no response' (P(n|h)), helps capture two kinds 
of arguments from ignorance:  
 
(a) not (Database says: not exists), therefore exists 
i.e., There is no evidence for X’s non-existence, therefore X exists.  
e.g., Nobody has proven that ghosts do not exist, therefore ghosts exist.  
 
(b) not (Database says: exists), therefore not exists 
i.e., There is no evidence for X’s existence, therefore X does not exist. 
e.g., Nobody has proven that ghosts do exist, therefore ghosts do not exist.  
 
 The relative strengths of these two inferences depend on the exact values of the 
key probabilistic quantities involved. Typically, an inference of type (b) will be 
stronger than one of type (a), and both will be less compelling than corresponding 
inferences from positive evidence with the same characteristics (for specific examples, 
see Corner & Hahn, 2009; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007, 2008). However, both (a) and (b) 
can be acceptable. 
We propose that the Faint Praise effect stems from an inference of type (b) 
above. To return to our example, the referee does not say that James is good at maths, 
so the inference that is subsequently made is that he is not good at maths. The reader’s 
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degree of belief in the falsity of a given hypothesis having not received a specific item 
of evidence is given by Bayes’ Theorem: 
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)|()(
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     Eq. 2 
 
where P(n|¬h) = 1 – [P(e|¬h) + P(¬e |¬h)] and P(n) = 1 – [P(e) + P(¬e)]. The Faint 
Praise effect should occur wherever the probability of a ‘nothing’ response is less if 
the hypothesis is true than if it is false, )|()|( hnPhnP  , and thus the likelihood 
ratio,  
)|(
)|(
hnP
hnP

, is less than one. In this case, the non-occurrence itself is informative 
because it suggests that the hypothesis is false.  Hence, the effect should be observed 
where a motivated (or positively inclined), but non-lying source is presenting an 
argument. By contrast, there is no reason for this negative inference in the case of a 
maximally uninformed source, 1
)|(
)|(

hnP
hnP
, who simply knows nothing on the topic, 
or given a source who prefers, where possible, to explicitly provide negative 
information, in which case it is likely that 1
)|(
)|(

hnP
hnP
. In reality, however, a 
motivation to be polite (e.g., Bonnefon, Feeney, & De Neys, 2011; Brown & 
Levinson, 1987) will likely ensure that the latter situation is considerably rarer than 
the Faint Praise effect.  
The current account therefore incorporates Gricean pragmatics of conversation 
into a normative Bayesian framework. Gricean considerations guide our assignments 
of conditional probabilities, that is, as listeners we interpret speakers’ utterances in 
light of shared conversational norms that guide our expectations about what kind of 
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information the speaker should deliver. At the same time, the formalization brings out 
the relationship between specifically Gricean examples, and the many other arguments 
from ignorance found in day to day life - such as the, at surface level, quite different 
examples above concerning ghosts, timetables or socks.  
Returning to our example of the reference letter, consider that instead of being 
written by James’ mathematics teacher, it was written by James’ tutor who does not 
teach mathematics and who only rarely meets with James. In this instance, it could 
reasonably be assumed that his tutor would not possess any specialist knowledge 
concerning James’ mathematical ability. With this assumption, the reader of the 
reference letter could not make any inferences pertaining to James’ mathematical 
ability on the basis of the letter. Consequently, we would not predict the occurrence of 
a Faint Praise effect in this instance as )|()|( hnPhnP   and therefore 
1
)|(
)|(

hnP
hnP
. 
 It should also be clear from the above, and the explanatory focus on what is not 
being said, that information preceding the weak argument will affect its influence. 
Returning again to our example, consider now the case in which the referee has 
already stated that the candidate is an excellent mathematician. Following this 
testimony, it is likely that the reader has raised their opinion of James’ mathematical 
ability. If the referee now adds that the candidate is polite and punctual (our previous 
weak argument), what effect will it have upon the reader’s newly revised degree of 
belief? On the view that a weak positive argument has a negative impact as a result of 
not including important positive information (an implicit argument from ignorance), a 
negative impact is no longer predicted (as the important positive information is 
included). A strong argument in favor of the candidate has already been presented, and 
so this new evidence will have a persuasive impact based solely upon the importance 
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that the reader places upon punctuality. Hence, the reader’s opinion of the candidate 
will either remain unchanged or increase, but it will not decrease.   
 We next test whether “faint praise” does possess these characteristics. If the 
critical piece of evidence is intrinsically viewed as positive, it should exert a positive 
effect where there is no ‘missing’ evidence. In other words, a weak argument preceded 
by relevant information (a strong argument) should have a positive effect.  In the 
absence of that information, however, an overall negative effect should be observed, 
and the strength of that negative belief change should depend on the degree of closure 
associated with the source. In other words, a weak positive argument alone will result 
in a decreased degree of belief in the hypothesis under evaluation when coming from 
an expert source (a Faint Praise effect), but no such effect will be observed when the 
argument comes from a non-expert source (on source effects more generally see e.g., 
Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983; Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Hahn, Harris & Corner, 2009; 
Schum, 1981).  
Method 
Participants 
 95, predominantly female, Cardiff University undergraduates participated for 
course credit.  
Design, Materials and Procedure 
 We manipulated two variables: expertise (i.e., the presumed knowledge) of the 
source, and the type of argument presented. There were three experimental conditions. 
Participants either read a strong followed by a weak argument from an expert source 
(n = 32), only a weak argument from an expert source (n = 32), or only a weak 
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argument from a non-expert source (n = 31). A full factorial design was not 
appropriate in this experiment, as the non-expert source does not have the necessary 
information to provide a strong argument.   
 Participants were presented with a mock UCAS application
1
 containing 
background information (date of birth, address, GCSE grades
2
) about a fictional 
individual, James Driver. Based on this information, participants were required to 
indicate on a 21-point scale from 0 (never) to 100 (definitely) whether they thought 
James should be offered a place to study mathematics at Newcastle University. This 
rating constitutes a prior degree of belief in the hypothesis that the applicant should be 
offered a place . Depending on the experimental condition participants were assigned 
to, they were then presented with either one or two arguments from an expert or a non-
expert source. The expert source was an A-level mathematics teacher, who had ‘taught 
James maths throughout his AS and A-level course.’ The non-expert source was the 
personal tutor of the applicant, who only met him ‘once a term to discuss any concerns 
James has’. The weak argument stated: 
 
 ‘James is a polite and punctual pupil’. 
 
The strong argument stated: 
 
‘James has been a member of the top set for maths since the start of his sixth 
form studies. As a mathematician he is sharp and clever with an ability to 
critically analyse others’ proofs and theories. When new material is 
introduced he is quick on the uptake. On the odd occasion when he has failed 
to grasp a concept straight away, he has demonstrated considerable maturity 
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in his use of the library’s resources to help him understand the topic in 
question.’  
 
Following each argument, participants were asked to provide updated ratings of 
whether they thought James should be accepted onto the course.  
 At the end of the experiment, we obtained participants’ estimates of the 
relevant conditional probabilities involved in the Bayesian formalization of the 
argument (see Eq. 2) as a manipulation check. Since our formalization posits that the 
effect results from missing information, participants provided six conditional 
probabilities, three conditional on the state of affairs that James is an intelligent and 
resourceful mathematician, and three conditional on the state of affairs that James is 
NOT an intelligent and resourceful mathematician
 
(see Appendix).  
 
Results 
Figure 1 demonstrates the effect of all the information provided in the 
experiment on participants’ ratings of James’ suitability for reading mathematics at 
Newcastle University. From Figure 1, it can be seen that the strong argument was 
clearly effective in increasing participants’ ratings of James’ suitability to be accepted 
onto the course. 
The main goal of the experiment was to investigate the effect of weak positive 
information when presented by either an expert (the maths teacher) or non-expert (the 
tutor) either on its own, or preceded by a strong argument. In order to address this 
question, we calculated change scores to illustrate the effect of the weak argument. 
These scores were calculated by subtracting the admission belief ratings provided 
following the weak argument, from the admission belief ratings provided following 
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the previously presented information. From Figure 1, this is akin to taking the right 
hand column for each experimental condition and subtracting the value from the 
column immediately to its left. A change score was thus computed for each 
participant. The mean change scores are shown in Figure 2. 
A factorial ANOVA revealed significant effects of both the argument, F(1, 92) 
= 13.26, p < .001, MSE = 62.33, and source, F(1, 92) = 4.76, p = .032, MSE = 62.33, 
variables on the effect of the weak argument. Our predictions, however, were more 
specific than merely detailing differences between experimental conditions. 
Specifically, we predicted that the weak argument would exert a negative effect on 
admission belief ratings only when it was presented on its own by an expert source. 
Individual single sample t-tests conducted on the belief change scores (Figure 2) show 
this to be the case. A weak argument presented on its own by an expert had a 
significant negative effect on participants’ judgments of James’ suitability, t(31) = 
2.93, p = .006. A weak argument presented following a strong argument, by an expert, 
had a positive effect, t(31) = 2.98, p = .006, thus demonstrating that the weak positive 
information was indeed weak positive information, rather than neutral or irrelevant 
information. As predicted, the weak argument presented on its own by a non-expert 
did not affect participants’ judgments of James’ suitability, t(30) = 0.78, p = .440.3 
 Having obtained subjective estimates of the relevant conditional probabilities 
from participants, the Bayesian account is able to make quantitative as well as 
qualitative predictions of the effect of different arguments. For those participants 
receiving only the weak argument (those also receiving a strong argument were not 
included as, for them, P(n|h) and P(n|¬h) are not relevant as the information is not 
missing), we observed a positive correlation between their predicted final admission 
belief ratings (from Equation 2) and those they provided directly, r(60) = .43, p < .001, 
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further illustrating the power of a probabilistic account in accounting for different 
degrees of belief change (see also, Harris, Hsu, & Madsen, 2012). Of the 58 (out of 
62) participants whose ratings of P(n|¬h) were greater than P(n|h), 57 of them did not 
revise their belief downwards as much as predicted by the Bayesian model, consistent 
with conservative belief updating (e.g., Edwards, 1968; Phillips & Edwards, 1966). 
4,5
 
  
Discussion 
At first glance, the Faint Praise effect seemingly presents a challenge to the 
Bayesian theory of belief revision. How can positive evidence ever lead to negative 
belief change? We proposed that the effect is an example of an implicit argument from 
ignorance; the negative belief revision is driven by inferences about the absence of 
positive information. A Bayesian formalization incorporating the concept of epistemic 
closure enabled empirical predictions to be made and tested.  
The experimental data matched the Bayesian predictions. Specifically, weak 
positive evidence from a knowledgable (expert) source gave rise to a Faint Praise 
effect in the absence of any strong positive evidence. A Faint Praise effect was not 
observed when the weak evidence was preceded by strong positive evidence. Indeed, 
the small but significant increase in belief brought about by the weak argument in this 
condition illustrates the complexity of the relationships here. It is not simply the case 
that the weak evidence is completely irrelevant. It is considered positive evidence, but, 
in the weak argument only condition, the effect of the (stronger) missing evidence is 
overpowering. Finally, as predicted, there was no Faint Praise effect when the 
evidence was presented by a non-expert source.  
The Bayesian formalization and the data presented here enhance understanding 
of the Faint Praise effect in several ways. They provide an empirical test of Grice’s 
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intuitions, whilst also extending Grice’s treatment. In particular, it is demonstrated 
how the relevant inferences are graded. The Faint Praise phenomenon is not simply a 
consequence of a conversational implicature which is drawn or not (as it seems on 
Grice’s account), instead it reflects a probabilistic judgment that is subject to degrees. 
Conceptually, the gradedness arises because epistemic closure itself is a matter of 
degree; empirically this is confirmed by the correlation between the likelihood ratio, 
)|(
)|(
hnP
hnP

, and the amount of belief change observed. 
 Furthermore, locating the Faint Praise phenomenon in the wider context of 
arguments from ignorance, and Bayesian argumentation in general, makes clear that 
there are virtually limitless possibilities for the subtle effects that can arise here. Any 
factor that will influence the likelihood ratio will influence the impact of a reference 
letter - for example, any evidence of bias (e.g., dislike) on the part of the source (see 
e.g., Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983; Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; McKenzie, Lee & Chen, 
2002; Schum, 1981). More subtly, certain contextual changes will likely influence this 
likelihood ratio. In the reference letter example, the communication is relatively 
anonymous, confidential, and concerns a third person. In a face-to-face setting where 
the subject (i.e., James) is also present, politeness concerns will usually lead to an 
even greater reluctance to express negative information. Empirical studies have shown 
that people are sensitive to pragmatic implications of these politeness concerns and 
adjust their understanding accordingly (e.g., Bonnefon, Feeney, & Villejoubert, 2009; 
Bonnefon & Villejoubert, 2006; Demeure, Bonnefon, & Raufaste, 2008, 2009; 
Juanchich, Sirota, & Butler, 2012; Sirota & Juanchich, 2012).   
The Bayesian framework also allows clear predictions about the impact of 
whatever positive information is provided in addition to that which is perceived to be 
missing. Here too, the Bayesian framework captures naturally both message source 
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and message content characteristics and their interaction (for detailed treatment and 
experimental evidence, see Hahn et al., 2009). This includes the extent to which 
multiple pieces of evidence “hang together” or “cohere” (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; 
Harris & Hahn, 2009). In short, the Bayesian formalization allows the many individual 
factors that determine the impact of evidence to be incorporated within a single overall 
framework that enables clear predictions, not just about these factors individually, but 
also their interactions.   
The results of our experiment also have implications for other models of belief 
or attitude formation. In particular, our results cannot be accommodated by traditional 
averaging models of belief adjustment (e.g., Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Lopes, 1985), 
as these would predict the opposite effect to that observed in the present study. An 
averaging model effectively evaluates the polarity of a piece of information with 
respect to current belief. Thus, such models predict a stronger negative effect of 
positive evidence after the receipt of a strong argument than without the prior receipt 
of a strong argument. While such a result is often observed in traditional belief 
updating tasks (see Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Lopes, 1985, and references therein), it 
is the opposite of what is observed here. Lopes (1985) tentatively suggested that 
averaging might be less likely to occur in situations where stimuli were more clearly 
‘marked’ in support of or against a given hypothesis.  Subsequently, Lopes (1987) 
succeeded in reducing participants’ use of an averaging rule by instructing them to 
separate their judgments of belief updating into two steps, where the first required 
labelling a piece of evidence as either favoring or countering the hypothesis. We 
believe that our participants did not show the use of sub-optimal averaging strategies 
because the domain used is familiar to them and hence the evidence is subjectively 
well ‘marked’ as to the hypothesis it supports. The failure to observe the use of 
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averaging strategies in this context suggests that previous documentation of their sub-
optimal usage may result, at least partly, from the unfamiliar and artificial nature of 
traditional belief updating tasks, such as the bookbag and poker chip paradigm (e.g., 
Phillips & Edwards, 1966; for another context in which participants seem to prefer an 
optimal strategy over averaging see Harris & Hahn, 2009).  
A similar result to ours was observed by Fernbach, Darlow, and Sloman 
(2011), who found that the presence of a weak generative cause reduced participants’ 
judgments of the likelihood of an outcome (effect). The explanation offered for this 
paradoxical finding was that people focus on the single focal cause provided when 
judging the conditional probability of the effect given the cause, P(E|C). When 
judging the marginal probability, P(E), however, participants bring to mind a variety 
of possible causes, thus increasing its subjective likelihood. This account relies on a 
causal relationship of E causing C, which is absent in our Faint Praise scenario. 
Fernbach et al.’s ‘Weak Evidence effect’ and our ‘Faint Praise effect’ are therefore 
qualitatively different phenomena. 
There is, however, another model in the literature that might be applied to our 
data. This model (McKenzie et al., 2002) was developed to explain changes of opinion 
in the context of sequentially presented disputes. In four experiments, McKenzie et al. 
found evidence that was independently judged to weakly support one side of the 
dispute actually decreased support for that side when presented after a strong case for 
the opposition. This was explained through the idea of a dynamic (and hence 
malleable) reference point against which the strength of the evidence in favor of a 
position is assessed, its so-called Minimum Acceptable Strength. Weak supporting 
evidence can lower support for one side if the opposing side presents strong evidence, 
because the strength of the latter influences where the reference point is set: 
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participants’ implicitly reason that ‘If that’s the best they can do, then I believe the 
other side (even) more.’” (McKenzie et al., 2002, p. 14).  
The parallel to our own Faint Praise effect is clear, and on closer inspection, 
McKenzie et al.’s (2002) results seem well explained by the concept of epistemic 
closure and the argument from ignorance employed here. The strong case in their 
studies consisted of several individual pieces of evidence, whereas the weak case 
consisted of only one. In particular, the weak case did not seek to challenge or rebut 
all of the evidence provided by the opposition. This absence of a rebuttal is implicit 
negative evidence that signals tacit assent: if the defendant had evidence to counter the 
prosecution’s evidential claims, then surely they would provide it. Moreover, the 
absence of a rebuttal is more glaring, and hence informative, if the opposing evidence 
has already been heard than when it has not (Experiment 3; for further references 
demonstrating such order effects see Hahn & Oaksford, 2012). It is also more 
informative when it comes from the defendant, a source that is highly motivated and 
hence well-placed to provide all available evidence, than when it comes from an 
independent third party (Experiment 4), in direct analogy to our “expert” and “non-
expert” source.  
Hence, we see no reason to invoke a special purpose ‘comparative standard’, 
for either McKenzie et al.’s (2002) data or ours. Rather, both fit well within the 
probabilistic framework, which receives additional support through the fact that the 
magnitude of the Faint Praise effect in our experiment is predicted by the relevant 
conditional probabilities participants provided. 
In conclusion, ‘faint praise’ invokes an argument from ignorance. This 
argument form arises in everyday contexts as diverse as language learning (Hahn & 
Oaksford, 2008; Hsu & Griffiths, 2009), informal reasoning (Oaksford & Hahn, 
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2004), science communication (Corner & Hahn, 2009), and science education 
(Fishman, 2009). The Bayesian formalization provides a unified treatment of these and 
makes clear how and why this common form of argument, which was until recently 
considered fallacious, is rationally justified. In so doing, it exemplifies how a 
Bayesian approach to informal reasoning and argument can give detailed explanation 
of where evidence and arguments are weak and where they should be viewed as 
strong. In this context, the present study clearly indicates that the relationship between 
source and message characteristics is complex, and the effect that an argument will 
have cannot be predicted without information pertaining to that argument’s source. 
Persuasion researchers have long been aware of the importance of both message 
content and source characteristics in affecting attitude change (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1996). However, these have typically been viewed as alternatives 
in producing changes in belief within process models of persuasion. The Bayesian 
framework complements these process models through its ability to make detailed 
predictions about the complex, non-additive way in which source characteristics and 
message content can interact.  
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Footnotes 
 
 
 
1 
UCAS (Universities and Colleges Application System) is the organization 
through which British school pupils apply to university. 
 
2
  GCSEs (General Certificates of Secondary Education) are the first public 
examinations taken by pupils in the UK. 
 
3 
In each condition, the modal belief change was zero, but the differences in the 
proportion of participants changing negatively or positively across conditions was 
consistent with the experimental predictions: Expert-weak (Negative: 38%; Positive: 
16%); Expert-strongweak (Negative: 0%; Positive: 28%); Nonexpert-weak (Negative: 
19%; Positive: 19%). Note, however, that the most appropriate analysis at the 
individual participant level is the correlation analysis between predicted final ratings 
and those participants provided. 
 
4 
One participant did not provide conditional probabilities and therefore could 
not be included in this analysis. 
 
5
 The model predictions for the regression analyses are based only on 
participants' priors and estimates of the conditional probabilities concerning the 
silence about James being an "intelligent and resourceful mathematician". They omit 
the weak positive effect of the "punctual and polite argument" in itself and are thus 
slightly conservative estimates of the correspondence between model and data.
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Figure 1. Mean ratings of applicant’s suitability at every stage of the experiment in 
each of the three experimental conditions. Error bars are plus and minus 1 standard 
error.  
 
Figure 2. Mean effect of the weak argument on ratings of applicant’s suitability 
(change scores) in each experimental condition. Error bars are plus and minus 1 
standard error. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Appendix 
Format of questions to elicit participants’ conditional probability ratings 
 
Participants gave 6 conditional probabilities, three conditional on the state of affairs 
that James is an intelligent and resourceful mathematician, and three conditional on 
the state of affairs that James is NOT an intelligent and resourceful mathematician. 
The format in which these questions were asked is given below: 
 
In your opinion, if James is an intelligent and resourceful mathematician, what 
is the chance that his maths teacher, who has taught James all his AS-level and 
A-level maths, would state in his UCAS reference for James: 
 
(a) that James is an intelligent and resourceful mathematician 
(b) that James is not an intelligent and resourceful mathematician 
(c) he would make no mention of this information 
 
Please report your answers as numbers between 0 (absolutely no chance) and 
100 (would be certain to report this information)  
(a) __________ 
(b) __________ 
(c) __________ 
 
 Participants in all experimental groups completed these questions, but for those 
in the non-expert group, the words ‘maths teacher, who has taught James all his AS-
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level and A-level maths’ were replaced by: ‘tutor, who meets with James once a term 
to discuss any concerns he might have’. 
 
